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COMMERCE IN RELIGION
Bernadette Meyler*
INTRODUCTION
Given the multifarious debates about the definition of religion
among philosophers, sociologists, and even adherents of religion,1 it
should come as no surprise that secular courts have engaged in
advanced acrobatics in the attempt to avoid determining religion's
limits and bounds. A central aim of what Kent Greenawalt and others
have termed the U.S. Supreme Court's hands-off approach to relig-
ious liberty2 is to avert the problems that might arise if nonreligious
© 2009 Bernadette Meyler. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may
reproduce and distribute copies of this Essay in any format, at or below cost, for
educational purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to
the Notre Dame Law Review, and includes this provision and copyright notice.
* Associate Professor, Cornell Law School. I am very grateful for the comments
of the participants in the American Association of Law Schools' (AALS) 2008 panel
on "The Supreme Court's 'Hands-Off" Approach to Religious Liberty" and I benefited
greatly from discussions with Doug Kysar and Nelson Tebbe. I owe much as well to
the excellent research assistance of Greg Demers and to the fine work of the editors
of the Notre Dame Law Review.
1 For instance, detailing influential theorist of religion John Hick's account of
how religions could be defined cross-culturally, Brian Hebblethwaite has written that
Hick has become less optimistic about cognitive complementarity [among
religions], and tends to fall back on comparable salvific efficacy.
This means that the ultimate referent of religious language-the nou-
menal Real, lying behind all phenomenal representations-becomes more
and more vague and unknown as Hick's Copernican revolution gets further
developed. As with Kant's noumenon, virtually nothing can be said about it.
Brian Hebblethwaite, John Hick and the Question of Truth in Religion, in READINGS IN
PHILOSOPHv OF RELIGION 383, 387 (Andrew Eshleman ed., 2008).
2 See Kent Greenawalt, Hands Off! Civil Court Involvement in Conflicts over Religious
Property, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1843, 1843, 1885-1906 (1998) (treating the "neutral prin-
ciples" and "polity-deference" rationales for courts' refusal to adjudicate religious
property disputes); Samuel J. Levine, Rethinking the Supreme Court's Hands-Off Approach
to Questions of Religious Practice and Belief, 25 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 85, 87 (1997) (explor-
ing the Court's expansion of judicial noninterference in deciding questions of relig-
ious belief and practice).
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courts were to choose among disparate accounts of church doctrine.
3
Similarly fraught questions are posed when a court attempts to decide
whether or not a particular set of beliefs and practices counts as relig-
ious. Although the law does, in a number of areas, make implicit
judgments about what fits within the rubric of religion, the Supreme
Court has notoriously refrained from providing a comprehensive
account of what "religion" means within the context of the First
Amendment. 4 The conception of religion that has emerged from the
European Court of Human Rights' (ECHR) adjudication of religious
liberty claims under the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention) 5
partakes of a similarly capacious imprecision. 6 Although the ECHR is
charged with the implementation of a treaty, not a Constitution, the
European Convention itself has, during the course of its history,
assumed increasingly constitutional status within Europe. 7 A variety of
factors, including the development of an evolving individual rights
jurisprudence and the internalization of ECHR protections into mem-
ber countries' domestic legal regimes, have contributed to this trans-
3 SeeJared A. Goldstein, Is There a "Religious Question" Doctrine? Judicial Authority
to Examine Religious Practices and Beliefs, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 497, 498-504 (2005)
(describing the Supreme Court's increasing tendency to avoid inquiry into matters of
religious doctrine, culminating in the 1990 decision in Employment Division v. Smith,
494 U.S. 872 (1990)); see also Richard W. Garnett, Assimilation, Toleration, and the
State's Interest in the Development of Religious Doctrine, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1645, 1652-60
(2004) (detailing and critiquing the Court's "no religious decisions" rule).
4 See Goldstein, supra note 3, at 526-27 ("Although no agreed meaning of the
term 'religion' has emerged under the First Amendment, a problem that has long
vexed courts and commentators, courts must nonetheless decide what constitutes a
religion in construing the state and federal tax codes, the Religious Freedom Restora-
tion Act (RFRA), the Free Exercise Clause, state constitutions, and hundreds (if not
thousands) of statutes that give special treatment to religious bodies and religious
practices." (footnotes omitted)).
5 Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention], available
at http://www.echr.coe.int/nr/rdonlyres/d5cc24a7-dcl3-4318-b457-5c9014916d7a/
0/englishanglais.pdf.
6 See, e.g., Jonatas E. M. Machado, Freedom of Religion: A View from Europe, 10
ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REx,. 451, 480 (2005).
7 See Alec Stone Sweet & Helen Keller, The Reception of the ECHR in National Legal
Orders, in A EUROPE OF RIGHTS: THE IMPACT OF THE ECHR ON NATIONAL LEGAL SYS-
TEMS 1, 7 (2008) (explaining that "[a]s a result of [various] developments, scholars
and judges now engage in a lively debate about the regime's constitutionalization,
and its possible constitutional futures" and elaborating that "it is undeniable that, in
the 21st century, the Convention and the Court perform functions that are compara-
ble to those performed by national constitutions and national constitutional courts in
Europe," while "the Court itself has come to see its role in constitutional terms").
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formation." On account of the European Convention regime's quasi-
constitutional status, the religious jurisprudence of the ECHR pro-
vides an instructive comparison to that of the U.S. Supreme Court.
Considering the rhetoric of religious liberty decisions issued by
both bodies reveals that, despite in general displaying a shared reluc-
tance to clearly demarcate the boundary between religion and non-
religion, the ECHR and the U.S. Supreme Court have adopted signifi-
cantly disparate understandings of the compatibility of religion with
the commercial sphere. Although the Supreme Court opinions
demonstrate a willingness to treat apparently commercial activities as
falling outside the purview of the financial immunity accorded to
religious activity under taxation and other regulatory schemes, they
tend not to separate out religious from commercial activity per se. 9
Hence a practice might be viewed under the American framework as
protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment 10 but
nevertheless be seen as subject to those federal laws applicable to com-
mercial activity. By contrast, in the ECHR context, once a particular
religion or a certain part of its purportedly religious enterprises
becomes characterized as commercial, this aspect of the religion is
quickly deemed either nonreligious or marginal to religious concerns.
As a variety of religions come to incorporate more commercial fea-
tures or to conceive of themselves as engaging in competition with
other entities within a marketplace, this jurisprudential difference
may produce increasingly significant divergences in the treatment of
religious liberty claims within Europe and the United States. "
The Supreme Court's decisions themselves do not, however,
appear entirely self-consistent. In some instances-such as the cases
involving the proselytizing activities of Jehovah's Witnesses from the
World War II period 12-the Court has eschewed a formal analysis of
whether an activity should be considered commercial, instead asking
whether the overarching purpose of the activity is religious. 13 On
other occasions-including the treatment of the Church of
8 Id. at 6-7.
9 See infra notes 117-24 and accompanying text.
10 U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law ... prohibiting the free
exercise [of religion] .... ).
11 See, e.g., Rebecca French, Shopping for Religion: The Change in Everyday Religious
Practice and Its Importance to the Law, 51 BUFF. L. REx,. 127, 139, 195-99 (2003) (discuss-
ing "a shift in the nature of religion as evidenced in a move toward the displacement
and consumer commodification of religion").
12 See, e.g., Jones v. Opelika (Jones 1), 316 U.S. 584 (1942), vacated per curiam,
Jones v. Opelika (Jones 11), 319 U.S. 103 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296
(1940).
13 See infra notes 56-68 and accompanying text.
2009]
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Scientology's practice of "auditing"-the Court has maintained that
the simple existence of a quid pro quo, regardless of the value of what
is exchanged, renders a transaction commercial, even if it is also
viewed as religious. 14 Despite this seeming discrepancy, the cases
share an emphasis on the sincerity of the vantage point of the particu-
lar actors involved. Whereas the religious purpose behind Jehovah's
Witnesses' proselytizing led the Court to determine that they should
not be subject to a license tax, 15 it was precisely the Scientologists'
belief that they were receiving a valuable service as manifested by the
fact that they were willing to pay for auditing that led the Court to
refuse them a tax exemption. 16
This emphasis on sincerity furnishes one of the central reasons
why U.S. courts are reluctant to follow the European model. Whereas
the Supreme Court displays a concern with individual sincerity-
whether that of the founders of a religion, its proselytizers, or its
adherents-the ECHR tends to view religion from a much more insti-
tutional perspective and to endorse efforts to prevent the consumers
of religion from being misled. 17 The contrast roughly reflects the pri-
ority placed upon religious organizations in the European context
and that given to individual claims of religious liberty in the U.S.
system. 18
Another set of reasons consists in doctrinal distinctions between
the ECHR's and the Supreme Court's treatments of the intersection
of speech and religion and in the dynamics of the two courts' protec-
tion of commercial speech. In cases that could be deemed to involve
either freedom of expression or the manifestation of religion, the
ECHR has often considered the claim solely as one of speech, whereas
the Supreme Court treats the combination of expression and free
exercise as entitled to special status as a "hybrid right."19 In addition,
14 See infra notes 122-24 and accompanying text.
15 See infra note 75 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 118-24 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 83-104 and accompanying text.
18 See Bernadette Meyler, The Limits of Group Rights: Religious Institutions and Relig-
ious Minorities in International Law, 22 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 535, 535-36
(describing the different roles of religious individuals and religious institutions in
U.S. and European jurisprudence).
19 See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990) ("The only decisions
in which we have held that the First Amendment bars application of a neutral, gener-
ally applicable law to religiously motivated action have involved not the Free Exercise
Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional
protections, such as freedom of speech and of the press ... ."); see also infra notes
83-97 and accompanying text (discussing the ECHR's tendency to separate questions
of religious freedom from those of free expression).
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both the EHCR and the Supreme Court view commercial speech less
deserving of protection than its noncommercial counterparts. 20
Hence, religious expression that falls within a commercial framework
has been devalued as speech meriting reduced regard.2 1
A final potential reason is more speculative. The disestablish-
ment of religion occurred later and more gradually in Europe than in
the United States-and it is still not fully completed. 22 Because estab-
lishment entails state funding for recognized religious groups, the
more prominent religious institutions would be less dependent for
survival upon the financial contributions of their adherents in coun-
tries maintaining an establishment of religion. Primarily those reli-
gions that are new or represent minority denominations not
acknowledged by the state would be obliged, in that context, to resort
to methods of fundraising that might recall the form of commercial
transactions. This circumstance could render it more likely that seem-
ingly commercial conduct of religion would be treated with disfavor in
systems, like those present in large parts of Europe, that currently
maintain or were historically accustomed to an establishment of
religion.
The remainder of this Essay examines how commercial concerns
emerge at the moments of founding, propagating, and practicing a
religion. In Part I, the Essay explores the U.S. Supreme Court's suspi-
cion regarding state efforts to prosecute religious fraud, a suspicion
that lacks parallel within the jurisprudence of the ECHR. Part II then
turns to the question of the standards by which the Supreme Court
and the ECHR determine whether, if ever, proselytizing can be con-
sidered commercial, and how this commercial aspect would affect its
legal treatment. Finally, Part III asks what understanding of religious
valuation emerges when courts view practices that religious adherents
claim are central to their religion as commercial.
I. FRAUDULENT FOUNDING
Imagine an individual who, upon thinking deeply about the con-
ditions of existence and the world as it appears to us, develops on her
20 See infra Part II.
21 See infra notes 54-96 and accompanying text.
22 See R. STEPHEN WARNER, A CHURCH OF OUR OWN 14-15 (2005) ("In Europe,
Christianity achieved a state monopoly in the fourth century, a religious establish-
ment that was consolidated over the next thousand years. Recent centuries in Europe
have seen the erosion of this establishment, an erosion properly known as 'seculariza-
tion.' In the United States, secularization, or disestablishment, took place soon after
the Revolution, when the First Amendment prohibition of a federal religious estab-
lishment was extended to the states.").
20091
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own a comprehensive account of life, death, and the place of human-
kind in the universe. Imagine also that she cannot quite persuade
herself to believe in this narrative that she has generated. Neverthe-
less, falling upon hard times, she realizes that the story is sufficiently
captivating that others might find it compelling and that she could
profit financially from presenting it as a new religion. After she has
collected revenues for ten years from a growing flock of followers, one
of these adherents discovers her diary, in which she has written of her
scheme and explained that she herself believes none of what she has
claimed. Would the disciple, in this case, necessarily discount the
entire religion as fraudulent? Or would he instead deem the
founder's own belief in the truth of the religious worldview that she
had disseminated immaterial?
According to one view of religious truth, the sincerity of the
founder of a religion would not determine the resulting tradition's
validity. To the extent that a religious person perceives a divine order,
the author of that order need not be-and usually is not-human;
furthermore, the human instrument by which the particular order has
been revealed may or may not be aware of the significance of her
discovery. Insofar as a religious system is deemed transcendent, it
therefore remains epistemologically valid prior to its construction by a
particular human agent, including the agent who has seemingly
founded it. Even if the bad faith of the person who established the
religion in question has been definitively established, individual
believers could still be justified in continuing to adhere to its
principles.
The 1944 U.S. Supreme Court case of United States v. Ballard (Bal-
lard 1)23 has entered the law and religion pantheon for the general
proposition that courts may not determine the truth or falsity of a
religious claim. 24 What is somewhat less remarked upon is the major-
ity's surprising conclusion that, although a decision on truth or falsity
might be impermissible, ajury could evaluate the sincerity of the relig-
ious adherent's belief in the propositions he or she had presented. 25
This emphasis on sincerity, while seeming to extricate courts from
entanglement in the intricacies of religious doctrine, simultaneously
suggests that the members of a religious movement receive a particu-
lar type of product: the relevant product consists not in the precise
23 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
24 Id. at 86; see, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 3, at 510 ("Ballard thus announces that
the Constitution cordons off a 'forbidden domain' that courts may not enter: courts
may not determine the truth or falsity of religious claims." (quoting Ballard I, 322 U.S.
at 87)).
25 See Ballard I, 322 U.S. at 85.
[VOL. 84:2
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doctrines subject to religious belief, which might not be verifiable
according to contemporary standards of proof, but instead in the sin-
cere belief of the founders of a particular religion. As long as the
putative religion's creators have acted in good faith, the Court seems
to say, civil tribunals will not be able to judge the value created, and
will simply accept that it exists.
Ballard I involved an appeal from a mail fraud prosecution
against Edna W. Ballard and her son Donald, founders of the "I Am"
religious movement. 26 Edna's husband, Guy, had originally been
indicted as well, but died before trial. 27 The defendants were charged
with making false representations-including representations about
their contact with Jesus and their power to heal others-and doing so
knowingly.28 The trial court instructed the jury not to assess whether
the underlying representations were true or false, but rather to evalu-
ate only the question of whether the defendants did "'honestly and in
good faith believe those things.' ''29 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit
reversed the conviction, reasoning that "the restriction of the issue in
question to that of good faith was error," and that, in order to suc-
ceed, the government would have to prove that at least some of the
representations the defendants had made were false.30 The Supreme
Court, in an opinion by Justice Douglas, held that the trial court had
properly instructed the jury and that the court could only legitimately
determine sincerity.31 The majority thus treated the religious beliefs
in question as a kind of black box, attempting to circumnavigate them
by resorting to an assessment of whether the defendants' beliefs were
or were not sincerely held.
While this result might seem satisfying on a formal level, as it
avoids the courts' direct entanglement in assessing the truth or falsity
of religious beliefs, the situation viewed as a whole raises difficult ques-
tions. How, for instance, could one justify a fraud prosecution against
a religion unless one were assuming that what the religious movement
alleged as a truth was not? Might one not resort to proof of the falsity
of the underlying religious statements as a demonstration of a relig-
ious proselytizer's bad faith? What even constitutes defrauding in the
religious sphere if we assess religious value through the eyes of the
receiver?
26 Id. at 79-80.
27 See Saint Germain Found. v. Comm'r, 26 T.C. 648, 656-57 (1956).
28 Ballard 1, 322 U.S. at 79-82.
29 Id. at 81 (quoting the language of the trial court in advising the jury).
30 Id. at 83.
31 Id. at 84.
20091
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Justice Jackson's dissent in the case emphasized some of these
points. 32 As Justice Jackson elaborated with respect to the perspective
from which the assessment of religious value should occur:
There appear to be persons-let us hope not many-who find
refreshment and courage in the teachings of the "I Am" cult. If the
members of the sect get comfort from the celestial guidance of their
"Saint Germain," however doubtful it seems to me, it is hard to say
that they do not get what they pay for. Scores of sects flourish in
this country by teaching what to me are queer notions. It is plain
that there is wide variety in American religious taste. The Ballards
are not alone in catering to it with a pretty dubious product. 33
These comments reveal a conflict between the majority's stance on
the source of religious value-seemingly embodied for them in the
sincerity of the founders of the religion-and Justice Jackson's own
perspective, which appears to exalt the viewpoint of the consumer of
religion.
When the case returned to the Court in 1946, in the aftermath of
new objections against the exclusion of women from the jury, Justice
Jackson concurred in the majority's dismissal of the indictment on the
grounds he had offered in his earlier dissent. 34 In addition, he
insisted that the potential insincerity of the Ballards' representations
could not, in and of itself, provide a sufficient basis for a conviction of
fraud.35 As he maintained, the Court's earlier determination that the
trial could not consider whether the Ballards' religious assertions were
true or false "leaves no statutory basis for conviction of fraud" because
"[fraud] requires . . . a provably false representation in addition to
knowledge of its falsity to make criminal mail fraud. '36 Although the
majority seemed assured that the federal government would simply
reindict the Ballards, 37 the prosecution may have been convinced by
Justice Jackson's reasoning; in any event, no additional charges were
filed and the "I Am" movement appears to have been thriving through
at least 1950.38 A website for the Saint Germain Foundation confirms
32 Id. at 93 (Jackson,J., dissenting). For example, Justice Jackson explained "that
one knowingly falsified is best proved by showing that what he said happened never
did happen. How can the Government prove these persons knew something to be
false which it cannot prove to be false?" Id.
33 Id. at 94.
34 Ballard v. United States (Ballard I1), 329 U.S. 187, 196-97 (1946) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 196 (Majority opinion).
38 See Saint Germain Found. v. Comm'r, 26 T.C. 648, 657 (1956).
[VOL. 84:2
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that the religion still persists.39 Nor has governmental recognition
continued to be withheld. Indeed, in 1956, the Tax Court deter-
mined that the "I Am" church was entitled to partake of the benefits
of the tax exemptions reserved for organizations operated exclusively
for religious purposes, despite the government's earlier prosecution
of the Ballards.40
II. PROTECTED PROSELYrIZING
Envision a church that wishes to increase its membership by
proselytizing on a radio station. In order to present its message, the
church must purchase an advertising slot. The resulting broadcast
focuses predominantly upon criticizing well-established religious tradi-
tions and promoting the doctrines of this particular organization.
The presentation also includes information about how to procure a
pamphlet about the church for a certain amount of money. Is the
institution's speech rendered commercial simply because it fits the
form of an advertisement or contains a request for money in
exchange for the publication? If, on one account, the speech
involved falls under the rubric of commerce, either because it results
from purchasing airtime or because it solicits an exchange of funds
for literature, is it rendered any less religious for that reason?
Although some measure of First Amendment protection is now
granted to commercial speech under the U.S. Constitution,4 1 the
Supreme Court's jurisprudence tended to devalue commercial speech
through much of the twentieth century. 42 A number of cases from the
39 See The "I Am" Activity of Saint Germain Foundation, http://www.saint
germainfoundation.org (last visited Nov. 23, 2008).
40 Saint Gennain Found., 26 T.C. at 660.
41 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980) ("In commercial speech cases ... a four-part analysis has developed. At the
outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by the First Amend-
ment. For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least must concern
lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted governmen-
tal interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine
whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and
whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest,"); Va. State
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761-65 (1976)
(elaborating upon the reasons for protecting even commercial speech under the First
Amendment).
42 See, e.g., Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 641-44 (1951) (affirming a maga-
zine subscription solicitor's conviction partly because "the fact that periodicals are
sold," while not "put[ting] them beyond the protection of the First Amendment,"
does "bring[] into the transaction a commercial feature" that weighs against the solic-
itor in the balance between the First Amendment interests he derives from the maga-
2009]
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World War II period involving Jehovah's Witnesses' efforts to engage
in door-to-door proselytizing through the sale of religious literature
therefore include significant debate about whether the Witnesses'
activities should or should not be considered commercial. The posi-
tion that gained ascendance in a set of cases decided in 1943-right
before the Court heard Ballard I-maintained that the Witnesses'
solicitation did not fall within a commercial framework. 43 The gen-
eral view that religious and charitable appeals for funds should not be
deemed commercial was reaffirmed by the Court in 1980 even after
commercial speech had begun to enjoy the protections of the First
Amendment.44
By contrast, although the ECHR has determined that proselytism
falls within the purview of the religious liberties protected by Article 9
of the European Convention, 45 it has been much more willing than
the U.S. Supreme Court to disaggregate speech from religion, to
accept the characterization of proselytism involving financial incen-
tives as a form of commercial speech and, as a consequence, to grant
it lesser consideration than other kinds of religion or speech. Hence,
in the 2003 case of Murphy v. Ireland,46 the ECHR, while not itself
categorizing the relevant speech as commercial rather than religious,
zine publisher and those of the private householder); Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316
U.S. 52, 54 (1942) (" [T] he streets are proper places for the exercise of the freedom of
communicating information and disseminating opinion and .... though the states
and municipalities may appropriately regulate the privilege in the public interest,
they may not unduly burden or proscribe its employment in these public thorough-
fares .... [T]he Constitution imposes no such restraint on government as respects
purely commercial advertising.").
43 See infra notes 72-78 and accompanying text.
44 See Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 632
(1980) (" [C] haritable appeals for funds, on the street or door to door, involve a vari-
ety of speech interests-communication of information, the dissemination and propa-
gation of views and ideas, and the advocacy of causes-that are within the protection
of the First Amendment. Soliciting financial support is undoubtedly subject to rea-
sonable regulation but the latter must be undertaken with due regard for the reality
that solicitation is characteristically intertwined with informative and perhaps persua-
sive speech seeking support for particular causes or for particular views on economic,
political, or social issues, and for the reality that without solicitation the flow of such
information and advocacy would likely cease. Canvassers in such contexts are necessa-
rily more than solicitors for money. Furthermore, because charitable solicitation does
more than inform private economic decisions and is not primarily concerned with
providing information about the characteristics and costs of goods and services, it has
not been dealt with in our cases as a variety of purely commercial speech.").
45 European Convention, supra note 5, art. 9; see also infra notes 75-76 and
accompanying text (discussing the inclusion of proselytism in Article 9 of the Euro-
pean Convention, which protects freedom of thought, conscience, and religion).
46 38 Eur. H.R. Rep. 212 (2003), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/echr.
[VOL. 84:2
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was willing to uphold a state-imposed restriction on religious radio
advertisement on the grounds that Ireland could permissibly distin-
guish between religious advertisements and religious programming
and ban the former while allowing the latter.
47
In both contexts, the notoriously vexed categorization of speech
as "commercial" provides a backdrop for the treatment of religious
proselytizing. Although Article 10 of the European Convention-that
protecting the freedom of expression-does not contain an explicit
distinction among forms of speech, 48 the ECHR's jurisprudence has,
like that of the U.S. Supreme Court, differentiated between commer-
cial and non-commercial varieties and, while including commercial
speech within the compass of Article 10, given it reduced protection. 49
The rationales for treating commercial speech distinctly have been
more fully explored in the U.S. than in the European context, in part
because, as one commentator has recently opined, "the categorization
approach to issues of freedom of expression may itself be attributed
broadly to American origins." 50 Both speaker- and listener-focused
grounds have been adduced for including commercial speech within
the embrace of the First Amendment. 51 Those advocating in favor of
47 See infra notes 85-97 and accompanying text.
48 Article 10 of the European Convention reads as follows:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall
include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information
and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of fron-
tiers. This article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of
broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or
penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society,
in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for
the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals,
for the protection of the reputation or the rights of others, for preventing
the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the
authority and impartiality of the judiciary.
European Convention, supra note 5, art. 10.
49 See Colin R. Munro, The Value of Commercial Speech, 62 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 134,
138-41 (2003) (elaborating upon the ECHR's treatment of commercial speech). As a
recent article explains, while commercial speech has not been highly valued by the
ECHR, the court's rationale behind deferring more to member states' judgments
when commercial speech is involved has not yet fully emerged. See generally Maya
Hertig Randall, Commercial Speech Under the European Convention on Human Rights:
Subordinate or Equal?, 6 HUM. RTs. L. Rrv. 53, 77-84 (2006).
50 Munro, supra note 49, at 135.
51 See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 762-64 (1976) (explaining that the fact that an advertiser's interests are eco-
nomic does not in and of itself justify removing his speech from First Amendment
2009]
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enhancing protections for commercial speech have often relied on a
particular vision of the marketplace of ideas and the autonomy of the
consumer, who, they claim, should be presented with the full range of
his choices in order to determine the best product for his needs. 52 By
contrast, those criticizing the notion that commercial speech is deserv-
ing of regard under the First Amendment have sometimes empha-
sized that a corporate speaker cannot assert the same autonomy
interests as other kinds of participants in the public arena because the
fiduciary duty to shareholders to maximize profits itself dictates the
permissible range of the corporation's speech. 53 Both in the U.S. and
European systems, however, the level of protection of commercial
speech has not been so high as to preclude the state from protecting
consumer interests of various kinds.
The Supreme Court's continued adherence to a distinction
between commercial speech and varieties of proselytism involving
monetary exchange may therefore not only signal an aim of treating
economic activities as compatible with religion but might also be con-
protection, and contending further that "the particular consumer's interest in the
free flow of commercial information ... may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his
interest in the day's most urgent political debate" and that "society also may have a
strong interest in the free flow of commercial information").
52 See, e.g., R.H. Coase, Advertising and Free Speech, 6J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 1-2 (1977)
(arguing that there are equally compelling reasons for valuing speech in the market-
place of goods as in the marketplace of ideas); Martin H. Redish & Howard M. Was-
serman, What's Good for General Motors: Corporate Speech and the Theory of Free Expression,
66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 235, 255-60 (1998) (contending that "the listener's rights
should be recognized as an independent basis on which to protect expression" and
that giving these rights their proper due suggests the desirability of protecting com-
mercial speech); see also Symposium, Thoughts on Commercial Speech: A Roundtable Dis-
cussion, 41 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 333, 338 (2007) (Kathleen M. Sullivan commenting)
("We fear government for speech more than markets; we have an anti-paternalism
principle for government telling us what to think and say in a way that we don't have
an anti-paternalism principle for government telling us how many hours we can work,
or what wages we can receive, in part because we're afraid of government manipulat-
ing ideas and engaging in thought control as a means of serving other values. And
when we tell people what they can hear or read, or listen to or watch, we're doing it to
prevent ideas from reaching and influencing them. That has a different valence than
the direct regulation of conduct.").
53 See C. Edwin Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 IOWA
L. REv. 1, 34-36 (1976) (emphasizing that speech functions as a manifestation of the
self and that, on account of the profit requirement, corporations cannot be consid-
ered as possessing the same interests in self-expression as other individuals or enti-
ties); see also Symposium, supra note 52, at 336 (Steven H. Shiffrin commenting) ("I
think one can also say [commercial speech] should be lower in the hierarchy of First
Amendment values because of the-in the case of corporations in particular-lack of
a liberty interest of the speaker.").
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nected with the permissible restrictions on commercial speech itself.
As the Court has observed, because commercial speech may mislead
the consumer, it can be subjected to regulation designed to reduce
the likelihood of fraud.54 The Ballard I case, however, demonstrates
that the Court will intervene in the assessment of whether fraud has
occurred in the religious sphere only under a very specific and narrow
range of circumstances. 55 Within U.S. constitutional jurisprudence,
therefore, religion has been granted substantial latitude to pursue
paths that, if engaged in by nonreligious entities, would be considered
commercial, without itself being given that label.
This was not always, however, the state of affairs. Indeed, the U.S.
Supreme Court initially took a tack similar to that which the ECHR
later adopted, but it changed course in the space of a year and the
rehearing of a single case. In 1942, in Jones v. Opelika (Jones 1),56 the
Court considered and rejected the free exercise claims in consoli-
dated cases of Jehovah's Witnesses who had been jailed for violating
ordinances requiring them to obtain and pay licensing fees for a per-
mit to engage in public sales or door-to-door solicitation. 57 Those
who pursued this form of proselytism would purchase a set of pam-
phlets from the national organization and charge an additional
amount to members of the public or householders who decided to
acquire one or more.58 There was some evidence that a number of
Jehovah's Witnesses would provide the literature gratis to those who
were unwilling or unable to pay but still wished to receive the materi-
54 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564
(1980) (excepting misleading speech from any First Amendment protection); Va.
Pharmacy Bd., 425 U.S. at 771-72 ("Nor is there any claim that prescription drug price
advertisements are forbidden because they are false or misleading in any way.
Untruthful speech, commercial or otherwise, has never been protected for its own
sake. Obviously, much commercial speech is not provably false, or even wholly false,
but only deceptive or misleading. We foresee no obstacle to a State's dealing effec-
tively with this problem. The First Amendment, as we construe it today, does not
prohibit the State from insuring that the stream of commercial information flow
cleanly as well as freely." (footnote and citations omitted)).
55 See supra notes 23-31 and accompanying text.
56 316 U.S. 584 (1942), vacated per curiam, Jones II, 319 U.S. 103 (1943). For a
discussion of the historical context of this reversal, see PatrickJ. Flynn, "Writing Their
Faith into the Laws of the Land:"Jehovah's Witnesses and the Supreme Court's Battle for the
Meaning of the Free Exercise Clause, 1939-1945, 10 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 1, 32-34 (2004),
and William Shepard McAninch, A Catalyst for the Evolution of Constitutional Law:Jeho-
vah's Witnesses in the Supreme Court, 55 U. CIN. L. REv. 997, 1034-40 (1987).
57 Jones I, 316 U.S. at 586.
58 See Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 119 (1943) (Reed, J., dissenting).
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als; nevertheless several lower courts determined that the defendants
had actually obtained money from sales. 59
The opinion for the divided Court, authored by Justice Reed,
stated as "[t]he sole constitutional question... whether a nondiscrim-
inatory license fee, presumably appropriate in amount, may be
imposed upon [the defendants'] activities. ' 60 Rejecting the distinc-
tion between a license and a tax on income or gross receipts, 61 the
five-Justice majority characterized the proselytizing in question as dif-
ferent in kind rather than degree from the pursuit of religious rituals
because money was involved. 62 While refraining from determining
that the Jehovah's Witnesses' sale of religious literature was an activity
exclusively commercial in nature, Justice Reed insisted that, because
the transactions fit a commercial form, they could appropriately be
subjected to a licensing fee. 63
The dissenting Justices, by contrast, emphasized that the Court
should examine the purpose rather than the form of the Jehovah's
Witnesses' activities and deem the overarching motivations non-com-
mercial in nature. 64 As Justice Stone argued, 65 criticizing the deploy-
ment of a licensing fee rather than a tax upon revenue, "[t]he
59 Jones I, 316 U.S. at 587 ("The court ... found petitioner guilty on evidence
that, without a license, he had been displaying pamphlets in his upraised hand and
walking on a city street selling them two for five cents."); id. at 591 ("The jury was
instructed to acquit unless it found the defendant was selling books or pamphlets. It
returned a verdict of guilty.").
60 Id. at 592-93.
61 Id. at 597.
62 Id. at 598 ("If we were to assume, as is here argued, that the licensed activities
involve religious rites, a different question would be presented. These are not taxes
on free will offerings. But it is because we view these sales as partaking more of com-
mercial than religious or educational transactions that we find the ordinances, as here
presented, valid.").
63 Id. at 596-97 ("Casual reflection verifies the suggestion that both teachers and
preachers need to receive support for themselves as well as alms and benefactions for
charity and the spread of knowledge. But when, as in these cases, the practitioners of
these noble callings choose to utilize the vending of their religious books and tracts as
a source of funds, the financial aspects of their transactions need not be wholly disre-
garded. To subject any religious or didactic group to a reasonable fee for their
money-making activities does not require a finding that the licensed acts are purely
commercial. It is enough that money is earned by the sale of articles."); id. at 597
("When proponents of religious or social theories use the ordinary commercial meth-
ods of sales of articles to raise propaganda funds, it is a natural and proper exercise of
the power of the State to charge reasonable fees for the privilege of canvassing.").
64 Id. at 602 (Stone, CJ., dissenting).
65 Justice Stone's opinion in this case has sometimes been viewed as articulating a
"Preferred Freedoms Doctrine," "heighten [ing] judicial protection to certain critical
rights listed in the First Amendment" rather than simply providing equal treatment.
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defendants' activities, if taxable at all, are taxable only because of the
funds which they solicit. But that solicitation is for funds for religious
purposes, and the present taxes are in no way gauged to the
receipts. '66 Although acknowledging that "[t]he immunity which
press and religion enjoy may sometimes be lost when they are united
with other activities not immune," Justice Stone maintained that the
relevant immunity had not been sacrificed in this case and that "[t] he
constitutional protection of the Bill of Rights is not to be evaded by
classifying with business callings an activity whose sole purpose is the
dissemination of ideas, and taxing it as business callings are taxed."
6 7
Despite possessing a superficially commercial form, the Jehovah's Wit-
nesses' proselytizing could not, according to Justice Stone, be
crammed into a commercial box.
The other dissenters, led by Justice Murphy, similarly emphasized
the religious rather than commercial purpose and motivations of the
defendants. As they explained, "It does not appear that their motives
were commercial, but only that they were evangelizing their faith as
they saw it. ' '68 They similarly concluded that "[t]he exercise, without
commercial motives, of freedom of speech, freedom of the press, or
freedom of worship are not proper sources of taxation for general
revenue purposes. ' 69 Rather than disregarding the economic realities
faced as much by religious adherents as other members of the general
public, these dissenters observed that most individuals would require
some means of compensation for engaging even in the highest spiri-
tual calling lest they be deprived of all livelihood.7 0 AsJustice Murphy
elaborated:
It matters not that petitioners asked contributions for their
literature. Freedom of speech and freedom of the press cannot and
must not mean freedom only for those who can distribute their
broadsides without charge. There may be others with messages
more vital but purses less full, who must seek some reimbursement
for their outlay or else forego passing on their ideas.
7 1
He thereby dispensed with the majority's apparent conception of a
religiosity purified of all material and economic needs.
Kurt T. Lash, The Constitutional Convention of 1937: The Original Meaning of the New
Jurisprudential Deal, 70 FoRDHAM L. REv. 459, 502 (2001).
66 Jones I, 316 U.S. at 609 (Stone, C.J., dissenting).
67 Id. at 608.
68 Id. at 612 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
69 Id. at 620.
70 Id. at 612-19.
71 Id. at 619.
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The following year, the dissenters gained the ascendancy after
the reargument of Jones v. Opelika-aided by the resignation of Justice
Byrnes and the appointment of Justice Rutledge.7 2 In several cases
that came down on the same day,73 the Justices further played out the
arguments for treating the Jehovah's Witnesses' methods of proselytiz-
ing as religious or commercial. The new majority explored the histor-
ical grounding of the practices that the Witnesses had selected,
explaining in Murdock v. Pennsylvania that "[t] he hand distribution of
religious tracts is an age-old form of missionary evangelism-as old as
the history of printing presses" and "has been a potent force in various
religious movements down through the years." 74 Furthermore, they
suggested that the sincerity of the Witnesses' beliefs and practices
weighed in their favor.75 They likewise emphasized that the Jehovah's
Witnesses were far from unique among religions in the attempt to
gain financing through activities associated with religious practice. 76
As Justice Douglas suggested in Murdock, some aspects of even as tradi-
tional a type of practice as Catholic worship would be rendered non-
religious by circumscribing too narrowly the scope of noncommercial
religious activities: "[T] he mere fact that the religious literature is
'sold' by itinerant preachers rather than 'donated' does not transform
72 Jones II, 319 U.S. 103 (1943) (reargued Mar. 10-11, 1943). For a discussion of
the significance of the switch in Justices and an account of the gradual rise of Justice
Stone's position on religious liberty from Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S.
586 (1940), to the decision after reargument in Jones II, see generally Alpheus
Thomas Mason, The Core of Free Government, 1938-40: Mr. Justice Stone and "Preferred
Freedoms, "65 YALE L.J. 597 (1956) (tracing Justice Stone's decisions). See also David M.
Levitan, The Effect of the Appointment of a Supreme Court Justice, 28 U. TOL. L. REV. 37, 57
(1996) ("Justice Rutledge took his seat on the Court on February 15, 1943, and on
that very day the Court granted a petition for a rehearing and restored the Jones case
to the docket for reargument. It was reargued on March 10 and 11, 1943, and was
decided, and the earlier decision reversed, by a five-to-four vote on May 3, 1943. Jus-
tice Rutledge obviously cast the crucial and deciding vote, since none of the other
Justices shifted their positions from the earlier decision." (footnotes omitted)).
73 See Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); Murdock v. Pennsylvania,
319 U.S. 105 (1943).
74 Murdock, 319 U.S. at 108.
75 See id. at 109 ("The integrity of this conduct or behavior as a religious practice
has not been challenged. Nor do we have presented any question as to the sincerity
of petitioners in their religious beliefs and practices, however misguided they may be
thought to be.").
76 For an excellent discussion of how the majority in Jones I attempted to bolster
support for the practices of the Jehovah's Witnesses, whose movement was "unpopu-
lar and unfamiliar" at the time, by appealing to their similarity to the activities of
more established groups, see Samuel J. Levine, Toward a Religious Minority Voice: A
Look at Free Exercise Law Through a Religious Minority Perspective, 5 WM. & MARY BILL RTs.
J. 153, 164-65 (1996).
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evangelism into a commercial enterprise. If it did, then the passing of
the collection plate in church would make the church service a com-
mercial project."7 7 While acknowledging that, on occasion, transac-
tions engaged in by a religion or its adherents might fall on the
commercial side, Justice Douglas urged caution in so categorizing
religious endeavors. 78
Those who had comprised the majority in Jones Ibecame, on the
other hand, more vehement in their efforts to prove the inherently
commercial nature of the Witnesses' proselytizing. Justice Jackson, for
example, called into question the assumption that the Jehovah's Wit-
nesses comprised a non-profit organization and contended that the
financial information needed to determine this status was not forth-
coming.79 Others, led by Justice Reed, who played on the distinction
between pecuniary and otherwise "free" forms of religious exercise,8 0
insisted that the form of the transaction should dictate its treatment:
The quid pro quo is demanded .... The Witness sells books to raise
money for propagandizing his faith, just as other religious groups
might sponsor bazaars, or peddle tickets to church suppers, or sell
Bibles or prayer books for the same object. However high the pur-
pose or noble the aims of the Witness, the transaction has been
found by the state courts to be a sale under their ordinances .... 81
Nor was it only the reciprocity of payment and receipt between
the Witnesses and those who bought their literature that proved rele-
vant to these dissenters. As Justice Frankfurter's dissent argued, the
Witnesses had received the benefits of state revenue expenditure, and
were therefore under an obligation to reciprocate the state's invest-
ment.8s 2 For the dissenters, the mere fact of an exchange for value-
77 Murdock, 319 U.S. at 111.
78 See id. at 110-12.
79 See Douglas v. City ofJeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 169-70 (1943) (Jackson, J., con-
cutring in part and dissenting in part) ("The assumption that it is a 'non-profit chari-
table' corporation may be true, but it is without support beyond mere assertion. In
none of these cases has the assertion been supported by such usual evidence as a
balance sheet or an income statement. What its manufacturing costs and revenues
are, what salaries or bonuses it pays, what contracts it has for supplies or services we
simply do not know.").
80 See Murdock, 319 U.S. at 122 (Reed, J., dissenting).
81 Id. at 119.
82 Id. at 140 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("The ultimate question in determining
the constitutionality of a tax measure is-has the state given something for which it
can ask a return? There can be no doubt that these petitioners, like all who use the
streets, have received the benefits of government. Peace is maintained, traffic is regu-
lated, health is safeguarded-these are only some of the many incidents of municipal
administration.").
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whether between the Witnesses and recipients of their literature or
the state and religious practitioners-definitively placed the kind of
proselytism at issue in Jones and related cases on the commercial side
of the divide between commerce and religion.
The ECHR has similarly been reluctant to extend protection for
proselytism to activities that bear a commercial semblance. In the
1992 case of Kokkinakis v. Greece,83 the ECHR determined, in the face
of Greece's prohibition on proselytism and the conviction of a Jeho-
vah's Witness for violating this restriction, that Article 9 of the Euro-
pean Convention includes proselytism within the protection it accords
to the freedom to "manifest [one's] religion. '84 More recently, how-
ever, the ECHR's 2003 decision in Murphy v. Ireland revealed that this
liberty would not stretch far into what might be deemed the commer-
cial sphere. In Murphy, the ECHR considered a claim brought by a
pastor of the Irish Faith Centre, a Christian ministry in Dublin.8 5 The
pastor claimed that his Article 9 rights had been violated because Irish
law prevented him from broadcasting an advertisement about his
church. 86
83 260 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 6 (1993).
84 Id. at 17 ("As enshrined in Article 9, freedom of thought, conscience and relig-
ion is one of the foundations of a 'democratic society' within the meaning of the
Convention. It is, in its religious dimension, one of the most vital elements that go to
make up the identity of believers and their conception of life, but it is also a precious
asset for atheists, agnostics, skeptics and the unconcerned. The pluralism indis-
sociable from a democratic society, which has been dearly won over the centuries,
depends on it. While religious freedom is primarily a matter of individual conscience,
it also implies, inter alia, freedom to 'manifest [one's] religion.' Bearing witness in
words and deeds is bound up with the existence of religious convictions." (alteration
in original)); see also European Convention, supra note 5, art. 9 ("Everyone has the
right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to
change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others
and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, prac-
tice and observance.").
85 38 Eur. H.R. Rep. 212, 216 (2003), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/echr.
86 Id. at 216-18. Although Murphy was unsuccessful in his application to the
ECHR, Irish law was subsequently somewhat altered in the aftermath of the adjudica-
tion of his case in Ireland. See G.F. Whyte, The Frontiers of Religious Liberty: A Common-
wealth Celebration of the 25th Anniversary of the U.N. Declaration on Religious Tolerance-
Ireland, 21 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 43, 53-54 (2007) ("Section 20(4) of the Broadcasting
Authority Act of 1960 and Section 10(3) of the Radio and Television Act of 1988
prohibited the broadcasting of, inter alia, any advertisement 'which [was] directed
towards any religious ... end.' However, in 2001 this ban was modified somewhat by
Section 65 of the Broadcasting Act of 2001 to permit the broadcasting of advertise-
ments for religious publications, religious events, and religious ceremonies. Such was
permitted, provided the broadcasts did 'not address the issue of the merits or other-
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Rather than considering the applicant's claim as one that impli-
cated both speech and religion, the ECHR categorized the matter as
involving expression, not free exercise, opining that "the matter essen-
tially at issue in the present case is the applicant's exclusion from
broadcasting an advertisement, an issue concerning primarily the reg-
ulation of his means of expression and not his profession or manifes-
tation of his religion."87 Thus, despite the applicant's insistence that
his efforts to advertise the church were protected by Article 9 of the
European Convention,8 the ECHR instead evaluated his claim under
Article 10.
Although the ECHR's opinion initially classified the relevant
speech as religious more than commercial expression, stating that
"[t]he Court notes at the outset that the nature and purpose of the
expression contained in the relevant advertisement accords with its
being treated as religious, as opposed to commercial, expression even
if the applicant purchased the relevant broadcasting time," 89 the
ECHR ultimately accepted the distinction that Ireland endeavored to
draw between the status of religious programming and advertise-
ments. 90 According to Article 10 and the jurisprudence of the ECHR,
a governmental interference with speech may be justified if prescribed
by law and necessary in a democratic society.9 1 In assessing whether
Ireland's restriction on speech was, in this case, "necessary in a demo-
cratic society," the ECHR considered the fact that the prohibition on
religious speech was limited to advertising.9 2 The ECHR therefore
seemingly endorsed Ireland's attempt to differentiate between relig-
ious programming and religious advertising:
Moreover, the prohibition related only to advertising. This
Court considers that this limitation reflects a reasonable distinction
made by the State between, on the one hand, purchasing broadcast-
ing time to advertise and, on the other, coverage of religious mat-
wise of adhering to any religious faith or belief or of becoming a member of any
religion or religious organisation.'" (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted)).
87 Murphy, 38 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 232. To the extent that the ECHR did deem the
expression at issue religious, this determination did not aid Murphy's application.
Instead, the ECHR has granted states a much broader margin of appreciation for
regulation in the area of religious expression than in other spheres. See George Let-
sas, Two Concepts of the Margin of Appreciation, 26 OxFoiJ. LEGAL STUD. 705, 724-28
(2006) (explaining the ECHR's special treatment of expression that might offend
others' religious or moral sensibilities).
88 Murphy, 38 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 229-32.
89 Id. at 235.
90 See id. at 236.
91 See European Convention, supra note 5, art. 10.
92 See Murphy, 38 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 233-38.
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ters through programming (including documentaries, debates,
films, discussions and live coverage of religious events and occa-
sions). Programmes are not broadcast because a party has pur-
chased airtime and, as outlined by the Government, they must be
impartial, neutral and balanced, the objective value of which obliga-
tion the parties did not dispute. The applicant retained the same
right as any other citizen to participate in programmes on religious
matters and to have services of his Church broadcast in the audiovi-
sual media. Advertising, however, tends to have a distinctly partial
objective . . .93
Despite its claim to be treating Murphy's potential speech as
religious rather than commercial, the ECHR thus endorsed Ireland's
implicit devaluation of advertising, including advertising of a religious
variety.94 On this basis, the ECHR deemed valid the Irish govern-
ment's claim that the prohibition on religious advertising was neces-
sary to prevent religious strife in a country that had previously been
subject to such strife.95 Article 10 of the European Convention was,
therefore, not violated, according to the ECHR.96
III. COMMERCIAL CONDUCT
Think of a religion that, as part of providing a comprehensive
worldview to believers, decides to give its members religious alterna-
tives to a variety of services that they would otherwise take advantage
of within secular society. Among the offerings of this religion are ses-
sions that seem functionally similar to psychotherapy and activities
that increase physical fitness in ways that resemble classes at a gym.
Suppose also that this religion requires that adherents pay a fixed
"contribution" for each of these sessions. Should these sessions be
envisioned as taxable products? If so, are they thereby rendered non-
religious? If the religion in question features many of these kinds of
services, is it really a religion or does it constitute a commercial
enterprise?
These questions have been raised most concretely in legal deci-
sions concerning the Church of Scientology. The Church of
Scientology has been confronted in a number of different nations
with the charge of being a commercial rather than a religious entity.9 7
93 Id. at 236.
94 See id. at 238.
95 Id. at 234-38.
96 Id. at 238.
97 For a comparison of American, English, Australian, and German approaches
to considering whether the Church of Scientology is a religion, see Paul Horwitz,
Scientology in Court: A Comparative Analysis and Some Thoughts on Selected Issues in Law
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For example, in Germany in the early 1990s, this accusation was
spread widely by the Federal Parliament in Bonn as well as the Parlia-
ments of the Ldnder, and the major German political parties excluded
Scientologists from membership.98
Individual adherents of Scientology have also faced challenges
with respect to the religious character of one of the practices they
consider essential, that of auditing. The process has been described
as follows:
Scientologists believe that an immortal spiritual being exists in
every person. A person becomes aware of this spiritual dimension
through a process known as "auditing." Auditing involves a one-to-
one encounter between a participant (known as a "preclear") and a
Church official (known as an "auditor"). An electronic device, the
E-meter, helps the auditor identify the preclear's areas of spiritual
difficulty by measuring skin responses during a question and answer
session....
The Church charges a "fixed donation," also known as a "price"
or a "fixed contribution," for participants to gain access to auditing
and training sessions.... This system of mandatory fixed charges is
based on a central tenet of Scientology known as the "doctrine of
exchange," according to which any time a person receives some-
thing he must pay something back.9 9
As one might anticipate from the invocation of a "doctrine of
exchange" and the fact that a price is set for auditing sessions, the sale
and Religion, 47 DEPAUL L. REv. 85 (1997). For a discussion of the widespread belief
that Scientology is a commercial enterprise rather than a religion, see generally Ben-
jamin Beit-Hallahmi, Scientology: Religion or Racket?, 8 MARBURG J. RELIGION 1 (2003).
As Beit-Hallahmi writes,
Since the 1960s, courts and governments have ruled that Scientology is a
secular, profit-making organization, and should be treated as such. Thus,
the tax-exempt status of the organization in France was revoked in 1985,
after it had been determined that its aim was profit-making. Later on, Spain,
Greece, Germany, and Denmark decided to treat it as a for-profit
organization.
Id. at 15.
98 Scientology Kirche Deutschland v. Germany, App. No. 34614/96, 89-A Eur.
Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 163, 165 (1997). For an assessment of the respective treat-
ments of Scientology in Germany and the United States concluding that the German
approach to the movement has been more rigid than the American, see Michael
Browne, Comment, Should Germany Stop Wonying and Love the Octopus? Freedom of Relig-
ion and the Church of Scientology in Germany and the United States, 9 IND. INT'L & COMP. L.
REv. 155, 186-99 (1998).
99 Hernandez v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680, 684-85 (1989) (footnote and citations
omitted).
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of E-meters and the payment for auditing sessions have in many con-
texts been deemed commercial activities. For example, even the U.S.
Supreme Court refused to find that individual Scientologist's pay-
ments for auditing services were tax deductible or that this violated
the Free Exercise Clause. 10 ° In doing so, it applied a formal test-
akin to that used by the Court in Jones I-that assessed the existence
of a quid pro quo. 1 1 Despite this determination, however, the Court
did continue to view auditing as a religious activity, assuming that the
value of the quid pro quo was assessed in the eyes of the religious
beholder.1 0 2 By contrast, the ECHR classifies activities like purchasing
an E-Meter or investing in auditing services as commercial and there-
fore refuses to view them as falling within the European Convention's
provisions protecting the manifestation of religion.10 3 Whereas under
the U.S. model religion and commerce can coexist, under the Euro-
pean paradigm, once an activity or entity is deemed commercial, it
fails to be considered religious at all.
The European mode of addressing the relationship between the
commercial and the religious is exemplified by the European Com-
mission of Human Rights' (Commission) decision in X. & Church of
Scientology v. Sweden finding the Church of Scientology's claim of a vio-
lation of the "freedom to manifest a religious belief in practice" pro-
tected by Article 9 of the European Convention inadmissible. 10 4 The
Church had been prohibited by a judicial injunction in Sweden from
publishing an advertisement for the E-Meter that read "Scientology
technology of today demands that you have your own E-meter. The E-
meter (Hebbard Electrometer) is an electronic [instrument] for mea-
suring the mental state of an individual and changes of the state.
There exists no way to clear without an E-meter. Price: 850 CR."10 5
The injunction demanded alterations in the language and repre-
sentations of the advertisement before it could be published and was
justified on the grounds of protecting potential consumers. 0 6 Before
assessing whether this particular injunction violated the European
Convention, the Commission declared that it was "of the opinion that
the concept, contained in the first paragraph of Article 9, concerning
the manifestation of a belief in practice does not confer protection on
100 Id. at 684.
101 Id. at 689.
102 See id. at 694.
103 SeeX. & Church of Scientology v. Sweden, App. No. 7805/77, 16 Eur. Comm'n
H.R. Dec. & Rep. 68 (1979).
104 Id. at 68, 75.
105 Id. at 69.
106 Id.
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statements of purported religious belief which appear as selling 'argu-
ments' in advertisements of a purely commercial nature by a religious
group."'0 7 Applying this general principle to the advertisement in
question, the Commission determined that it constituted "more the
manifestation of a desire to market goods for profit than the manifes-
tation of a belief in practice, within the proper sense of that term."' 08
The case did not, therefore, fall within the compass of Article 9, in the
Commission's view.' 09 Because it construed the advertisement as com-
mercial activity, the Commission refrained from adjudicating the
Church of Scientology's claims as ones for freedom of religious
practice. "10
The Commission instead resolved the application by evaluating it
under Article 10.11 As noted earlier, a state may interfere with free
speech only if this interference is prescribed by law and necessary in a
democratic society. 1 2 Claiming in X. & Church of Scientology that com-
mercial speech deserves fewer protections than its noncommercial
counterparts, the Commission applied the requirement of "necessity"
less stringently than in other contexts."13 The injunction could, there-
fore, be upheld on the ground that the court issuing it had found that
"the advertisements were misleading and that it was important to safe-
guard the interests of consumers in matters of marketing activities by
religious communities and especially in the present case where the
consumer would be particularly susceptible to selling arguments."114
Despite the fact that the advertisements were only distributed to mem-
bers of the Church of Scientology, the Commission determined it suf-
107 Id. at 72.
108 Id.
109 Id. at 75.
110 Although dealing with commercial practice rather than speech, the ECHR case
of Cha'are Shalom ve Tsedek v. France, 2000-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 231, demonstrated a simi-
lar propensity for considering the commercial as potentially outside the purview of
Article 9. In evaluating and rejecting the claims of a Jewish liturgical association of a
right to perform ritual slaughter, the ECHR viewed France's assertion that "the appli-
cant association's activity was essentially commercial, and only religious in an acces-
sory way, since it mainly sought to supply meat from animals slaughtered by its ritual
slaughterers which was certified 'glatt', and that it could therefore not be considered a
'religious body"' as falling within the State's appropriate margin of appreciation. See
id. at 256.
111 X. & Church of Scientology, App. No. 7805/77, 16 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. &
Rep. at 72.
112 Id.; see also note 91 and accompanying text.
113 For the Commission's and the ECHR's tendency to devalue commercial
speech, see supra note 49 and accompanying text.
114 X. & Church of Scientology, App. No. 7805/77, 16 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. &
Rep. at 74.
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ficient that the enjoining court had found that the notices were
intended to stimulate interest in purchase of the E-Meter both within
the Scientology community and more broadly. 1 5 Both consumers
within the Church and outside of it were therefore construed as bene-
ficiaries of the injunction. In this instance, the Commission first clas-
sified the activity in question as commercial and, therefore, not
religious, then, because of its deference to state claims of necessity in
restrictions on speech-and, in particular, commercial speech-
viewed the State's actions as falling within the sphere of activity per-
mitted by the European Convention.
The Commission's decision, furthermore, suggested a particular
vision of the relationship between a religion and its current or poten-
tial adherents. Unlike the U.S. Supreme Court in Ballard, which
eschewed the notion that religious institutions could be held account-
able for misleading or fraudulent, and not just insincere, representa-
tions, the Commission viewed the State as acting within the legitimate
bounds of its authority in policing the dissemination of religious asser-
tions. Indeed, the Commission's implicit endorsement of the Swedish
court's determination that state intervention was important "especially
in the present case where the consumer would be particularly suscep-
tible to selling arguments" indicates a willingness to view religious con-
sumers as even more in need of protection than secular ones, who
might presumably operate according to more of a rationalist instru-
mentalist logic. 116 This view insists upon the creation of value either
objectively or by the religious institution itself, rather than in a negoti-
ation among the founders, current members, and potential ones, and
maintains the ability of a state to assess the presence or absence of that
value.
The U.S. Supreme Court's treatment of the transaction involved
in auditing provides an instructive contrast. In the 1989 case of Her-
nandez v. Commissioner, 1 7 the Court considered whether payments for
auditing could be classified as "charitable contributions" within the
meaning of that phrase in the Internal Revenue Code.'18 The Court's
answer turned on whether a member of the Church of Scientology
could be thought to have received consideration in return for his sup-
posed contribution for auditing. If such a quid pro quo existed, Jus-
tice Marshall, writing for the Court, explained, the fees paid could
115 Id. at 73.
116 See id. at 74.
117 490 U.S. 680 (1989).
118 Id. at 684-89.
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hardly constitute charitable contributions.' 1 9 The Scientologists, as
well as Justices O'Connor and Scalia, in dissent, argued that analyzing
transactions through the formalistic lens of a quid pro quo is inappro-
priate when the benefit received is of a religious nature. 120 On the
surface, this debate bears some resemblance to the controversy
between the majority and dissenters in the Jones cases; indeed, Justice
Reed's dissent in Murdock relied heavily on the existence of a quid pro
quo. 121 In the Hernandez case, however, the questions of how to deter-
mine whether value is religious or secular and what that value is
assumed a much more central role in the opinions.
As Justice O'Connor emphasized through the example of par-
tially deductible contributions-in which context the taxpayer is per-
mitted to deduct the amount in excess of the value of the item or
service received-it may be difficult to ascertain the value of a relig-
ious benefit; 12 2 hence, assessment of whether a quid pro quo has actu-
ally occurred depends entirely on whether the religious adherent
does, in fact, place value upon the particular religious item or service
and believe this value commensurate to the amount he or she has
paid to the religious institution. The Court's response to this argu-
ment was, in part, to insist that even forcing courts to evaluate
whether a benefit is religious or secular "might raise problems of
entanglement between church and state."'123 In Hernandez, the Court
therefore both classified the transaction in question as a quid pro quo
and, hence, commercial, and maintained a studied indifference as to
the amount of the benefit obtained by those who procured auditing
services and even as to whether the underlying benefit could be con-
strued as religious or not.1 24 Unlike the ECHR, the Supreme Court
views the commercial and the religious as potentially coexisting; in
such instances, however, commercial valuation might not be per-
formed by the Court itself but thrown back upon the individual
believer. The value of an activity that might be either religious or sec-
119 Id. at 691-92.
120 See id. at 705-08 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
121 See supra text accompanying note 81.
122 Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 705-07 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
123 Id. at 694 (majority opinion). The Court also indicated that there might be
some circumstances in which the government would assess the value of a religious
benefit not by looking at the recipient but instead by examining the cost to the pro-
vider of furnishing it. Id. at 697-98 ("In cases where the economic value of a good or
service is elusive-where, for example, no comparable good or service is sold in the
marketplace-the IRS has eschewed benefit-focused valuation. Instead, it has often
employed as an alternative method of valuation an inquiry into the cost (if any) to the
donee of providing the good or service.").
124 See id. at 691-93.
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ular is, thus, demonstrated by the very fact of the adherent's sincere
belief that he is receiving a benefit for which he is willing to pay.
CONCLUSION
In many-and perhaps an increasing number of-instances,
religion overlaps with the commercial sphere and courts are obligated
to determine whether or not to adopt an entirely hands-off approach
simply because the specter of religion lurks on the horizon. Whereas
the jurisprudence of the ECHR tends to accept its member states' sep-
aration of commercial elements out from the protections more gener-
ally accorded to religion, the U.S. Supreme Court has treated the two
spheres as overlapping. To the extent that each court does consider
religious transactions in terms of commercial relations, they also
arrive at very different conceptions of the connection between a relig-
ious institution and the current or potential religious believer. While
the ECHR seems more concerned with protecting others against the
incursion of possibly misleading or offensive religious representations,
the Supreme Court appears to view religious value as generated
through a complex interaction between religious entities and individ-
ual adherents.
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